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Abstract 
 
Adapting Granovetter’s idea of the ‘strength of weak ties’ (1973), this article argues 
that capitalist, liberal democratic nation-states (‘liberal societies’) distribute both 
power and processes of legitimation widely across society. Against the view that such 
societies are only weakly legitimate, relying primarily on ideological hegemony, I 
argue that they enjoy real, but highly systemically diffused legitimacy.  To advance 
this argument I consider some the inherent problems in studying legitimacy in liberal 
contexts, and offer a preliminary outline of a cultural analysis of liberal legitimacy, 
exploring how legitimation processes are embedded in state-economy relations, civil 
society structures, public-private distinctions, and competition as a ubiquitous social 
form.  In this way I aim to encourage a more sociocultural, and less state-centric 
understanding of power and its legitimation in liberal society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction: Understanding Power in Liberal Nation-States 
 
Nation-states based on an interdependence of capitalist economies, liberal values, and 
democratic political institutions and procedures, are ascendant (Dahl 2000; Dunn 
2006) 1.  The have proliferated over the last 200 years, and become the dominant 
international model of the ideal nation-state.  Even China’s current efforts to digest 
this model piecemeal, attests to its success.  Part of this success has to do with the 
sheer international competitiveness of the model, in generating wealth, capturing 
resources, creating alliances, defending territory, and prosecuting geopolitical 
interests.  But another important part of this success, my concern here, has to do with 
how the power relations generated within such states are rendered acceptable to 
society’s members, in short, how they are successfully legitimated, so that these 
sociopolitical systems remain relatively stable.  I argue that prevalent ways of 
conceptualizing legitimacy are often inadequate for this task, being too narrowly 
defined in terms of formal political processes.  We need a more thoroughgoing 
cultural analysis to understand how an entire complex of institutions, ideas, identities, 
values and rituals combine in an historical cultural pattern to permeate liberal society, 
serving to legitimate its power relations.  Toward this end this article examines the 
idea of legitimacy and its relationship to liberalism, and then presents a preliminary 
framework for guiding the kind of cultural analysis proposed.   
 
I make two further points about the importance of this topic before proceeding.  First, 
scholars frequently identify a ‘civic’ or ‘liberal’ type of nation (Mann 2005: 55-61; 
Miller 1995; Brown, D. 2000), and one of the more influential ways of explaining 
people’s allegiance to this kind of nation is Michael Billig’s (1995) thesis of ‘banal 
nationalism’, that nationhood becomes a kind of everyday, taken-for-granted 
discursive frame.  Without gainsaying Billig’s insights, I think this approach also 
misses much, placing too much weight on how implicit knowledge and discourse 
shapes social action, and not enough on how power is actually organized and 
understood by social actors.  I aim to add a further dimension to our thinking here.  
More deeply, highly economically liberal nation-states, such as the US and the UK, 
also exhibit the most pronounced social inequality within the nation (Keister and 
Moller 2000; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Kawachi and Kennedy 2006).  And yet 
liberal nation-states have their modern origins in the wave 17th to 18th century 
revolutions that were premised on ideas of equality among members of the nation 
(Bendix 1978; Greenfeld 1993; Author 2009).  Why people in these societies accept 
such extremes of inequality, how modern nationalisms manage to extol ‘equality’ 
while institutionalizing hierarchy and inequalities, are persistent questions for our 
times.   
 
Legitimacy: General and Liberal 
 
                                                
1 Throughout this paper I will use the shorthand term ‘liberal society’ to succinctly 
indicate the variable but clear connections between capitalist economic organization, 
democratic political institutions, and a liberal ideology placing high value on 
individual autonomy and rights.  It is this historically emergent complex of economy, 
politics and ideology that I seek to better understand.  The term is used descriptively 
and analytically, not normatively, to identify a complex historical form of society, not 
simply a ‘layer’ of ideology or values within that form. 
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Before advancing a framework for the cultural analysis of liberal legitimacy, I 
examine the general concept of legitimacy, outline the difficulties of studying 
legitimacy in liberal contexts, and pose a general perspective and approach for 
studying legitimation processes in liberal society. 
 
Conceptualizing Legitimacy. Weber’s influential conception of legitimacy, which has 
shaped much of our thinking on the subject, contains a bedeviling ambiguity.  On one 
hand he treats legitimacy as a belief in the rightness of a given social order: ‘action, 
especially social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the 
belief in the existence of a legitimate order’ (1978: 31; cf. Poggi 2001).  On the other, 
he treats legitimacy as the acceptance of the authority of certain sources (rational, 
traditional, charismatic) of binding commands (1978: 215; cf. Wrong 2002).  The 
object of legitimacy shifts between belief systems, and more specifiable authorities 
operating within those systems.  In Weber’s conception, the acceptance of authority, 
and the beliefs that underpin that acceptance, are treated as much the same thing.  As 
Schaar (1984) observed, much social science usage replicates this ambiguity, rather 
loosely equating legitimacy with the belief or opinion that institutions are 
‘appropriate’ and ‘morally proper’ (see also Zelditch 2001).  Beetham (1991) suggests 
that Weber’s notion reduces to the assertion that legitimacy is the belief that 
something is legitimate, which is close to tautology, and anchors legitimacy in 
empirically poorly accessible realm of beliefs.  His solution is to offer a more 
operationalised, multidimensional formulation: 
 
Power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that: 
i) it conforms to established rules 
ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant 
and subordinate, and 
iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power 
relation (1991: 15-16). 
 
This provides a more precise set of criteria for how legitimacy is achieved, and a 
guide to where we might look to assess the state of legitimacy: to the presence or 
absence of rule following, of concordant beliefs, and of acts of consent. 
 
Beetham’s formulation is very helpful, but I have two reservations, and qualifications 
to make.  First, Beetham’s approach is ultimately very state-centric, but legitimacy 
pertains to power relations generally, throughout society.   While states and other 
political institutions may provide paramount instances of power, power relations and 
questions of legitimacy pervade society.  A ‘political science view’ of legitimacy 
yields misleading emphasis on the state, and especially democracy, as the only proper, 
or at least ultimate objects of legitimacy (e.g. Connolly 1984; Heywood 1994).  This 
diverts us from searching more widely for process of legitimation in other dimensions 
of social organization.  Society involves people in multiple settings and contexts of 
persistent power relations (families, workplaces, associations, etc.), which involve 
legitimacy to varying degrees (cf. Layder 2009).  The quality of legitimacy in one 
context may influence or counterbalance its quality in others. This suggests a need to 
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integrate narrowly political and more broadly sociological scopes for the concept, to 
grasp a wider causal matrix with an overall dynamic.2 
 
Second, despite ambiguities, there are virtues in Weber’s wide-ranging conception, 
which Beetham’s focus on the ‘how’ of legitimation loses sight of.  The social objects 
of legitimation are complexly layered.  At a first level, there are clearly constituted 
loci of authority—persons, organizations, agencies—endowed with certain formally 
recognized powers.  On a second level, there are more general patterns or 
distributions of power and authority in society, manifest in various social hierarchies.  
People are generally conscious, however resignedly, of being situated in such 
hierarchies.  Finally, there are entire belief systems and ideologies, that bolster and 
serve to legitimate the other two levels, but can, in extremis, themselves become 
objects of legitimation and delegitimation—whole patterns of belief can be called into 
question.  Legitimacy can become problematic at each of these levels, but the first 
level of socially constituted agents is most susceptible to conscious challenge, while 
the second two layers become progressively more naturalized and taken for granted.  
But it is precisely the ramping up of disputes over legitimacy, from specific agents of 
authority, to the general social order and its underpinning beliefs, that is diagnostic of 
deep social crisis, rather than routine contention around power.  This layered image of 
legitimation processes helps preserve and systematize Weber’s insight that both social 
agents and belief systems can gain or lose authority. 
 
The Problem of Liberal Legitimacy. The nature of legitimacy in liberal, democratic, 
capitalist nation-states is particularly obscure.  It is fairly clear how formal democracy 
reproduces legitimacy by institutionalizing the popular expression of consent to 
political rule and competition among contenders for political leadership.   But publics 
are often relatively disengaged from political processes, and political authorities and 
institutions often regarded with distrust.  A key problem is the ‘invisibility’ of well-
                                                
2 Since the mid-1990s there has been a salutary trend of renewed interest in questions 
of legitimation processes throughout society, beyond the state per se, in ways that are 
complimentary to the present argument.  Jost and Major (2001) bring together an 
array of scholars, primarily in social psychology, and to a lesser degree sociology and 
organization studies, focusing, inter alia, on how ideologies, social stereotypes, and 
notions of just distribution get legitimated and delegitimated.  More recent work in 
social psychology explores how micro level perceptions of legitimacy affect cognition 
and behavior.  Lammers et al (2008) found in experimental studies that the perception 
of illegitimacy of a power relationship tended to inhibit the powerful from initiating 
action, and to increase the readiness of the powerless to initiate action (see also 
Lammers and Stapel 2009; and Lammers and Galinski 2009).  Conceptualizing 
legitimacy in the broad weberian sense outlined above, Johnson et al (2006) review a 
range of social psychological and organizational studies to identify processes by 
which ‘new social objects’, i.e. innovations in either power roles for individuals, or 
organizational forms, gain local legitimacy and then diffuse and replicate in other 
local settings, finally achieving more widespread consensual acceptance.  These 
studies suggest new ways of investigating legitimacy below the state, in the complex 
organizational infrastructures of society.  However they are dominated by social 
psychology, with a much weaker contribution from sociology.  Correspondingly, they 
don’t hypothesize the larger, historical and systemic interrelation of legitimation in 
state, economy and society, the kind of cultural analysis, which I am advocating here. 
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functioning legitimacy.  It is much easier to operationalize legitimacy when it’s not 
working, than when it is.  When authoritarian regimes are challenged, or states are too 
weak to regulate societal conflicts, we see the problem.  But when things appear to 
run smoothly, we begin to doubt whether the idea of legitimacy is even relevant.  
Perhaps people are ignorant of the power relations they are subject to, and unable to 
interrogate them, or satisfied by affluence, and uninterested in questioning the power 
relations that underpin that affluence.  Either way, we are presented with the classic 
problem—how do you study an absence, explain why something (‘crisis’) isn’t 
happening?  Minimally, I suggest that research agendas should not be set in the first 
instance by what’s ‘doable’, but instead by what we think needs explanation.  
Fundamentally, there is something logically strange about ascribing regime problems 
to the failure of legitimacy, without correspondingly ascribing regime stability to the 
presence and success of legitimacy.  Theoretical coherence obliges us to look for this 
thing that is hard to find. 
 
Reflecting this problem, there are arguments on both left and right to suggest that the 
idea of legitimacy is irrelevant for understanding such societies.  On the left it gets 
argued that such societies enjoy not so much legitimacy as passive acquiescence to a 
regime of power that people cannot see beyond (e.g. Herman and Chomsky 1994).  
On the right one finds the view that questions of the best form of social order have 
been largely resolved within the western secular tradition, that the legitimacy of 
capitalism and liberal democracy are now firmly established, both theoretically and in 
the popular imagination (e.g. Fukuyama 1995).  But for the reasons just noted, neither 
of these positions is satisfactory.  The last time the question of liberal regime 
legitimacy was a focus of lively academic debate was when Habermas (1975), Offe 
(1984) and others argued that contradictions between the demands of the capitalist 
economy and the liberal democratic welfare state were leading to ‘crisis’ tendencies 
in regard to legitimacy for these kinds of polities.  Apart from these debates losing 
intellectual steam, the fact that the late 1970s into the 1980s in fact saw a 
reinvigoration of more economically liberal forms of capitalism seemed to undermine 
the thesis.  Ironically, the big story of ‘legitimation crisis’ in the last 25 years turned 
out to be the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The anticipated crisis of capitalist 
legitimacy failed to arrive, while the collapse of communist legitimacy took many by 
surprise.  More recently increasing attention is paid to the role of legitimacy in regard 
to the European Union, which as a relatively new, evolving, and remote governing 
institution, has an ongoing struggle to build legitimacy (e.g. Arnull and Wincott 2003; 
Holzhacker 2007).  And there is growing attention to the legitimacy of transnational 
bodies and civil society actors in driving political change and law-making (e.g. 
Warning 2009; Steffek et al. 2007).  These are important issues, but also underscore 
my point.  At issue here is the workings of developing political institutions, and the 
paradigm for inquiry is political science.  My interest is in the problem of 
understanding the legitimation of power as a diffuse social process within liberal 
nation-states.    
 
‘The Strength of Weak Legitimacy’: a framework for cultural analysis.  I have 
adapted Granovetter’s term ‘the strength of weak ties’ (1973, 1983) as a kind of 
catchphrase that sums up my approach. His counter-intuitive argument was that 
networks of ‘strong’ social ties, based on multiple role relations and enduring 
interactions, tend toward social closure, while networks of ‘weak’, looser, more role-
specific and episodic social ties, are more likely to ramify and link with other social 
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networks.  Thus ‘weak ties’ are more likely to create contacts and opportunities for 
ego (e.g. finding employment), and strengthen ego’s strategic social position.  Note 
that this analysis pertains particularly to life in liberal societies, in which fluid market 
relations fundamentally shape social power and opportunities.  However, I am not 
developing Granovetter’s network analysis, it is more the ‘spirit’ of his argument I 
want to invoke.  Liberal societies maximize systemic social power by allowing and 
cultivating sub-centers of power ‘below’ the state, that as long as they remain 
harnessed to a larger societal-state project, contribute to the overall power and 
dynamism of that system (Chirot 1994; Hall 1985).  The considerable power of the 
modern, capitalist, liberal democratic state, is achieved by dispersing power relations, 
and thus processes of legitimation, throughout the system.  Thus a vast ‘network’ of 
partial power relations, locally legitimized, add up to a strong system, with 
considerable legitimacy distributed along its sinews, despite the apex of political 
institutions enjoying only weak or episodic legitimacy. 
 
Capitalist economies and democratic political institutions are mainstays of liberal 
society.  But I want to avoid reducing the idea of liberal society to effects of economic 
and/or political institutions.  Instead I offer a more cultural analysis.  By culture I do 
not mean to specify the arts (elite and popular), intellectual production, or even more 
widely, systems of meaning and symbols, patterns of beliefs, ideas, values, mores, 
and so on (cf. Inglis 2004; Jenks 2005; Kuper 1999; Wuthnow 1978).  While 
incorporating this dimension, my conception is not so ideational, instead harking back 
to an older, more holistic anthropological tradition, in which culture stood for an 
entire complex of ways of organizing social life, that were at once both material and 
ideational, both cognitive and affective, and encompassed social structures and 
institutions, not just ideas about those structures and institutions.  What cuts this 
conception down to size, is the principle that a cultural analysis does not just scoop up 
anything in its path, but rather assumes that the central problematic of all social 
relations, is the regulation of power (Author 2006: 207-210).  Thus I am primarily 
interested in core yet ramifying patterns organizing social interaction and regulating 
power, while also cutting across the conventional analytic divisions of society into 
separate spheres of, e.g., politics, economics, social institutions, and culture (as 
values), as found in Parsons (e.g. 1977), or separate layers of the material and the 
ideational, marxian and otherwise, that however roundly critiqued, still pervade social 
science thinking, including most conceptions of culture. 
 
To help illustrate this point, consider the classic anthropological concern with kinship 
in horticultural and agrarian societies.  The deeper significance of kinship for such 
societies is not as a cognitive map that directs social action, but that the structural 
assignment of people by principles of birth, marriage, or other ritual incorporation 
into kin groups, regulates the distribution of powers, in terms of access to land and 
other resources, including status, prestige, offices of communal leadership, and so on 
(Wolf 2001: 349-352).  Kinship was so much a part of culture for early 
anthropologists, precisely because in many of the societies they studied, it was a core 
process, binding together diverse dimensions of the social order.  One of the key 
characteristics of liberal society is the severe (though uneven) attenuation of kinship 
structures.  So we must look elsewhere for our core patterns regulating social power, 
and should expect, given the scale, complexity, and dynamism of liberal society, a 
more multiple and manifold set of patterns, rather than a single dominant principle.  
This is what I aim to do in the next section, focusing on the themes of the state-
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economy relationship, civil society, private versus public, and competition.  Cultural 
analysis, as I envision it here, will not claim an exhaustive systemic account of 
society.  It’s merits lie in foregrounding underlying patterns that link together diverse 
aspects of society, stimulating inquiry, and challenging conventions of social analysis 
that artificially (though sometimes usefully) divide society into ‘spheres’, ‘layers’, 
‘domains’ and so on. 
 
On Hegemony.  Interlocutors have suggested that the established concept of 
‘hegemony’ might be better suited for the kind of analysis I am proposing.  However, 
key features of the idea distinguish it from what I mean by ‘weak legitimacy’.  
Whether in its original sense of domination or leadership of one state over others, or 
the later Marxian sense influenced particularly by Gramsci (1971), of the domination 
of a bourgeois class or ‘historical bloc’ of classes, hegemony specifies an underlying 
relationship of domination, however obscure this may be to those subject to it 
(Williams 1983: 144-146).  With ‘weak legitimacy’ I am trying to focus on deeply 
embedded structures of belief and action, that are not themselves relations of 
domination, however much they might enable these.  Next, hegemony is an 
irreducibly ‘strategic’ concept.  It’s formulation and use, particularly in the Marxian 
variant, is bound up with engaged political practice, and the analysis of how 
domination is achieved, and countered (Anderson 1976-77).  This is particularly 
evident in one of its furthest, ultimately post-marxian developments in Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe’s  Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), in which the 
economic and class analysis basis of the Marxian concept is abandoned, in favour of 
an idea of purely discursive, and relatively undetermined strategies of alliance among 
diverse subaltern groups (cf. Wood 1998).  The idea of ‘weak legitimacy’ does not 
have this strategic dimension.  Its purpose is to help describe and analyse liberal 
society as we find it; whether it has strategic utility would be a separate question.  
Finally, Gramsci’s concept is often presented as ‘cultural hegemony’, highlighting 
that domination is achieved by making the specific ideas and interests of the dominant 
class(es) seem general and part of a naturalized ‘common sense’.   It is seen as 
describing a struggle over culture-as-dominant-ideas, in which the aim is to cultivate 
the practical consciousness of subordinate groups/classes, so that these can provide an 
alternative common sense, and basis for political action (Bobbio 1988; Fontana 2005; 
Roseberry 1989: 44-49).  But as I’ve indicated, I am couching ‘weak legitimacy’ 
within a very different, much less ideational notion of culture, which aims to describe 
how power relations are routinely reproduced and legitimated, but does not offer in 
itself an alternative, or pose the problems of power as fundamentally epistemological.  
I conclude by noting correspondences between ‘hegemony’ and Billig’s (1995) idea 
of ‘banal nationalism’.  While Billig seems more directly influenced by Bourdieu’s 
notions of habitus and symbolic power (1991), these too bear resemblances to the 
concept of hegemony.  With ‘weak legitimacy’, by contrast, the emphasis is not on 
the discursive framing of understanding and its implicitness, but rather on the 
institutional, organizational and ideological embedding of power relations, which is 
implicit in some contexts, but quite explicit in others.   
 
A Framework for Cultural Analysis 
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I now develop the approach outlined in the previous section by pursuing four key 
themes: state and economy, civil society, public and private, and competition3.   Each 
serves as a lens for examining legitimation processes in liberal society, and is worth 
fuller exploration on its own.  Taken together they provide an initial framework for 
thinking about liberal legitimacy as a society-wide, cultural process.  
 
State and Economy: the ‘memorable alliance’:  The most fundamental structural 
aspect of power and legitimation in liberal societies, at once both institutional and 
ideational, is the division between, yet interdependence of, state and economy.  As 
Weber argued, modern rational capitalism was the unintended outcome of the 
‘memorable alliance’ of early modern mercantile bourgeoisies creating money 
through lending to monarchical European states locked in mercantile and military 
competition (Weber 1927: 337; Ingham 2008: 32-33; 126-17, passim). Today, 
capitalist liberal democracies operate on the basis of a balance of powers between 
core institutions of state and economy.  The power and authority of the state relies on 
the productivity and robustness of the economy, and capacity for wealth creation by 
economic actors is underwritten by the state’s administration and protection.  This 
twinned, reciprocal concentration of powers involves high degrees of both relative 
autonomy and interdependence for these two sectors.  The significance for processes 
of legitimation however, is that this reciprocal structure of organizational power is 
unevenly represented in public discourse. The state is normally represented as a social 
artifice whose powers are constituted, the legitimacy of which by definition is open to 
constant question.  The economy is more often represented as ‘harnessed nature’, as a 
source of power that is naturally given, and not subject to legitimation in the same 
way, however much the social mediators of that power might be. 
 
There is a curious structural echo here of those antecedent western European polities, 
in which legitimation revolved around a dualistic reciprocal dynamic between the 
secular and sacred powers of the state and church (see Poggi 2001: 74-96).  With 
secularization and the growth of the modern economy, increasingly it is the economy 
and its mediators, rather the divine and its priests, that claim the closest proximity to 
ultimate power, and the capacity to negotiate between it and the civic powers. In both 
cases, power and its legitimation is represented as dual and differentiated, with the 
state/secular powers ultimately accountable for worldly politics, societal 
administration, and so on, while economic/religious powers are less explicitly 
accountable to those they govern, instead interceding between transcendent sources 
and earthly civic institutions of power. 
 
Intellectuals and academics significantly shape our catalogue of ideas and vocabulary 
for collectively representing state, economy, and their relationship.  As Polanyi 
(1957) argued, the very idea of the economy as a distinctive, society-wide sphere of 
activity, functioning according to an independent set of laws and principles, emerges 
historically along with capitalism (cf. Murray 1997: 5-7).  The predominant modern 
academic disciplines of economics and political science tend to institutionalize and 
ideologically entrench the public perception that these are clearly distinct spheres of 
life, only contingently related, despite countervailing voices from fields such as 
                                                
3 ‘Science’ provides another mode of legitimation (cf. Habermas 1970), but this is 
generally true for modern society, and not specific to liberal society, so I have left it 
aside. 
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economic sociology (Smelser and Swedberg 1994) and political economy (Cohn 
2008: 3-4; cf. Wolf 1982: 7-19).  On balance, academics as a whole have been 
complicit in exaggerating the autonomy of economic and political power, and over-
associating problems of legitimacy with the state, thereby obscuring the ‘memorable 
alliance’ that we continue to live under. 
 
This basic pattern is replicated in predominant political discourses and associated 
political parties, those of the left favoring state powers and more inclined to critique 
economic powers, while those of the right favor maximizing power for major 
economic actors, while maintaining a critical eye on the powers of the state.  By their 
discursive polarization, they tend to exacerbate the view of state and economy as 
locked in a zero-sum struggle for power.  On whole citizens of such societies tend to 
relate to this dual power structure ambivalently, both suspicious and pragmatically 
supportive of both centers of power, because they sense it is this dual relationship that 
drives the economic prosperity that they generally enjoy.  Nonetheless, the dominant 
paradigm represents the economy as a natural force to be harnessed and cultivated, 
and the government of the day is judged on how well or poorly it achieves this.  Thus 
the burdens of authority and legitimacy tend to fall on the state and its occupants, 
more so than on economic organizations and actors.  However, in periods of 
economic strain and dysfunction, such as we are currently experiencing in the wake of 
the sub-prime mortgage lending debacle, that the veil of naturalized power falls, and 
the artificial and ‘earthly’ nature of economic power, and questions of its legitimacy 
and competent management, are more fully exposed.  But we should expect a 
reassertion of the naturalizing tendency in regard to economic power, because this is 
part of what validates the political powers of democratic institutions, to be affirmed 
not just by ‘the will of the people’ as citizens and voters, but by its successful 
relationship to a transcendent source of power, whether ‘god’, or the ‘economy’. 
 
Civil Society:  Civil society, the capacity of large populations to enjoy relative 
autonomy from the control of kin groups and state, and to associate and mobilize 
around common interests, is historically bound up with the formation of liberal 
society (cf. Gellner 1996; Hall and Trentmann 2005).  Indeed, the great dualism of 
economic and state powers just discussed was crucial to its emergence in the modern 
period.  It is that over-arching balance of power that fosters over time the 
multiplication of smaller, more localized centers of organizational power, whether 
enterprises seeking economic opportunity, or other forms of association seeking to 
protect or advance collective interests.  Thus ‘civil society’ as I use it includes all 
kinds of activity, not just self-organization around social, political, and charitable 
causes, as is often the case in the recent revival of the term (cf. Klein and Stern 2006: 
48).  The key point here is that each diverse form of social organization within this 
manifold, precisely because it enjoys relative autonomy, provides an arena for more 
localized processes of legitimacy, for challenging or affirming leadership, governance 
structures, or concordance with core values (to echo Beetham’s model).  And this 
happens in contexts that are much more immediate, tangible and evident in their 
consequences for those involved, than the encompassing structures of government and 
economy.  The very principle of civil society allows for the correction of weak local 
legitimacy, in that if an organization one is involved in loses legitimacy (the pastor is 
too liberal, the head teacher is incompetent, the CEO lacks vision) one can withdraw 
and reinvest one’s energies elsewhere (Hirschman 1970).  Up to a point of course.  
The ability to ‘shop around’ is strongly conditioned by the resources at one’s 
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command—structural poverty severely constrains choices.  And some involvements 
are more binding than other.  It may be easier to choose another church than to choose 
another employer.  Be that as it may, the broader point holds that liberal society, in 
maximizing these opportunities for choice and involvement, effectively distributes 
legitimation problems and processes more widely, variably and diffusely, throughout 
the social system.   
 
The function of political parties in the liberal system deserves attention here. These 
are ambivalently situated in the civil society-state relationship. By their nature, parties 
are designed to move into and out of the state.  When successful, they acquire the 
offices and powers of government, and when unsuccessful, they lose these and are 
thrown back down into civil society.  Thus smaller, cause-oriented ‘third’ parties, 
such as the Greens, manage to seem more ‘of’ civil society, precisely because of their 
limited access to state power.  But the major parties (especially in two-party systems) 
oscillate between state and civil society, gaining legitimacy when they are ‘out of 
power’ and ‘closer to the people’, and then in a sense slowly being drained of 
legitimacy the longer they are ‘in government’, and inevitably shown to be limited in 
their capacity to control events.  Thus, in the liberal democratic system, they function 
like dredges, scooping up legitimacy in the realm of civil society, and delivering it to 
the state, which suffers from chronic depletion of legitimacy. 
 
I treat civil society largely as a structural concept with descriptive utility, but its 
revival and return in academic parlance in the last two decades has much to do with 
its rhetorical effects.  As rallying cry for those seeking to break with Soviet rule in 
eastern Europe and the now post-soviet states (Pelczynski 1988; Hann 1995), or as a 
replacement for class among post-marxists in the ‘west’ looking for a new basis for 
mobilization and legitimacy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Cohen and Arato 1992), it has 
carried a heavy normative and strategic load.  Reiterating my comments about 
Gramsci’s hegemony, I invoke it here not as a device of social critique or political 
mobilization, but as part of an explanation of the diffusion of power relations and 
legitimation problems in liberal society, and the relative stability this enables. 
 
Public and Private:  If the preceding discussions of state, economy and civil society 
outline, in a sense, the ‘anatomy’ of liberal society, the next sections on the 
public/private dichotomy, and competition, while still concerned with institutional 
structures, take us more to the ‘spirits’ that animate the social body.   
 
All societies of any scale and complexity exhibit some distinction between public and 
private spheres, but this distinction is particularly pronounced in liberal society, and 
crucial for the allocation of power and the cultivation of legitimacy.  By placing legal 
limits on the extension of the powers of the state, the state affirms, within limits, a 
sphere of autonomous powers, and myriad loci for more localized processes of 
legitimation (Bobbio 1989: 1-21).  The spatial metaphor is of course deceptive, 
because the two sides are mutually constituted.  For instance, it takes the public power 
of the state to create and support the value of money, which then facilitates (again 
within limits) the private pursuit of diverse wants and goals.  Precisely because it is so 
central to the constitution of liberal society, the private/public boundary becomes a 
fulcrum for contestation, e.g. over the right of the state to intervene in matters of 
abortion, assisted suicide and sexual behavior, to collect and hold genetic data, or the 
responsibility of the state to protect children at risk, provide healthcare, or a national 
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broadcasting network.  So in one sense, the modern liberal state penetrates as never 
before into personal life and decision-making, but in another, it provides exceptional 
conditions for, and protection of, the private pursuit of ends.  
 
The idea of civil society rests awkwardly on this distinction.  For some it is precisely 
a realm where public political interests are formulated and mobilized.  Its significance 
is as a space in which multiple sub-centers of organization and solidarity around 
causes can be cultivated, and brought to bear on the wider society and the state4.  For 
others, it is primarily a realm where people are allowed to go about their private 
business unhampered.  Its significance is precisely in providing release from binding 
obligations, and the space to cultivate true autonomy and individualism.  These 
understandings tend to align, respectively, with a ‘new left’ oriented to post-
materialist politics organized around identities and issues, and a ‘classically liberal’ 
right concerned to protect liberal individualism from the encroachments of the 
modern state.  The point however, is that this is not simply a contradiction in 
theoretical understandings to be resolved, it is a description of the dynamic by which 
the cultivation and legal construction of a relatively private sphere, diffuses power 
and processes of legitimation into the wider society, creating bodies which can both 
stand at a distance from, and address themselves to, the public sphere, and ultimately 
state power.  The capacity of the liberal state to legitimate itself via civil society by 
allowing dissent, and plural and alternative centers of authority and legitimacy, rests 
on this public/private distinction.  
 
The boundary, or perhaps better the ‘allocation’, between public and private is made 
materially manifest especially through notions of property.  In law, property is 
frequently conceived as a ‘bundle of rights’, the allocation between persons, or to 
persons by a public power, of certain rights in both material and non-material) things.  
It rests on the idea of a sovereign that can allocate such bundles of rights, both in 
principle and in practice, and that in doing so, in a sense devolves a portion of that 
sovereignty in the act.  So, just as the UK state has sought to enhance its overall 
legitimacy in recent years by devolving legislative and administrative powers to some 
of it parts in Scotland and Wales, by creating sub-powers with political legitimacy 
closer to the ground5, so the entire system of property, at the micro level, cultivates 
systemic legitimacy, by allowing spheres of limited sovereignty allocated to 
individuals and collectivities.  Contra the marxian tradition, private property, while it 
may involve the alienation and mystification of labor power, also involves the 
devolution of power, in this special sense.  Pragmatically, it often appears as the best 
means that those with little power and resources have, of increasing control over their 
own lives.  But contra some versions of classical liberalism, public and private 
sovereignties are mutually constituting and interdependent.  In one sense liberal 
                                                
4 Cf. Habermas’s idea of the ‘public sphere’ (1989) and its critical reception, e.g. 
Calhoun (1992), Fraser (1990). 
5 As indicated by recurrent poll results showing that most Scots would like to see the 
powers of their parliament increased (Curtice et al. 2009: 62), even while they may 
have some reservations about its actions. 
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society just is an ongoing power struggle over the public and private allocation of 
property.   
 
The preceding puts the ‘household’ in an interesting light.  As a unit of income (if 
rarely production these days) and consumption, a cluster of properties (a ‘bundle of 
bundles’), it is the key point at which the counter-sovereignties afforded by private 
property, become more than just vehicles of personal choice, and particularly in 
multi-individual households, the place where the private is re-collectivized.  The 
sovereignty of the modern household, however hemmed in, is one of the most 
important forms of ‘devolution’ at the disposal of the liberal state.  Both the broad 
appeal of converting public to private housing in the UK in recent decades, and the 
reckless proliferation of sub-prime mortgages in the US in recent years, are testaments 
to this point.  The proliferation of relatively cheap commodities for the household, 
especially in the form of home entertainment, computing, and cell phones, augments 
the sense of the household as a sphere of autonomy and self-determination.  Feminist 
scholars have long noted a dark side to the household in regard to gender relations 
(Reiter 1975; Walby 1990; Okin 1991).  The private ‘domestic’ sphere also provides a 
means of devolving and reproducing patriarchal relations (‘a man’s home is his 
castle’), inter alia, by keeping women relatively confined to that sphere, making them 
disproportionately responsible for providing unpaid labor for its maintenance, and by 
situating men as heads with preponderant control of household resources.  As much as 
we may disapprove of this situation (which isn’t historically static), the point holds 
that by its very internal hierarchy (also over children) the household even more 
exemplifies a micro-zone of sovereignty, especially for the head of household, 
whatever their gender.  The greater power that supports the conditions for this system 
of local rule, the liberal state, thereby benefits from the reflected legitimacy of the 
household. 
 
Finally under this head, we must not forget the public protection of the individual 
body and mind as private domains.  The growth of consumer culture, along with 
expanding the capacity to pursue luxury and recreational goods according to personal 
taste, has seen waves of liberalization of bodily presentation, in terms of dress and 
adornment, indeed a positive encouragement to assert one’s individualism through 
one’s appearance.  Even if this kind of self-determination is ultimately trivial, it is 
nonetheless visceral, and responds to a demand.  More deeply however, fundamental 
freedoms of belief, conscience, and self-expression, with institutional origins 
particularly in the religious conflicts of 16th and 17th century Europe, should not be 
taken for granted.  One’s ability to commit freely to ideas and values manifests a kind 
of personal sovereignty.   By expanding the range of possible objects of belief, 
appetite, and fantasy, liberal and consumer culture provisions us with myriad means 
for occupying our thoughts and feelings, facilitating the exercise of sovereignty 
within the more private universe of mind and body. 
 
Competition: There is a tradition of  ‘conflict theory’ in sociology (Collins 1975; 
Coser 1956; Rex 1961) that places social conflict, its dynamics and regulation, at the 
centre of sociological explanation.   But there is no general ‘sociology of 
competition’, despite the extreme elaboration of this social form in liberal society, and 
its core role in processes of legitimation.  With only a few exceptions (e.g. Simmel 
1955: 57-85; Helle 2008; Deutsch 1949), competition arises mainly as a particular 
conceptual focus within specific fields, not surprisingly economic sociology (e.g. 
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Brown, P. 2000; Burt 1993; Podolny 2005; Uzzi 1997) but also others such as the 
sociologies of science (e.g. Hagstrom 1974) and education (e.g. Dunlop 1976).  I 
suggest that a more general sociology of competition is needed. 
 
The difference between conflict and competition is important.  Social conflict occurs 
in any clash of interests and/or ideas, and can be relatively unbounded and open-
ended, oriented either to zero-sum claims over limited goods or ends (e.g. territory), 
or to vying attempts to realize fundamentally incompatible ends (e.g. communism 
versus capitalism).  Competition refers more narrowly to an effort to outperform 
others in a structured context, in order to lay claim to some mutually desired, but un-
sharable end (a job, an award, market share, etc.).  Competition is social conflict 
controlled, channeled, and regulated, placed within a frame of shared understanding.   
While we sometimes use the term in a generic sense to refer to struggles to obtain 
goods in life, its distinctiveness lies in its proximity to the idea of a ‘contest’, of such 
struggles bounded by formal rules, and often highly ritualized. 
 
Outside of human social life, the main area where we use the term competition, is in 
regard to ecology and evolution, to understand how species compete to occupy 
ecological niches, and genes spread through, or are winnowed out, of populations.  
Here again, it is the focused contest over some limited ecological or genetic ‘space’ 
that makes the term competition rather than conflict appropriate.  Without challenging 
this appropriateness, we can nonetheless observe the powerful naturalizing 
ideological effect of a term that appears to apply in similar ways across the human 
and non-human worlds.  Just as we noted above that the powers of economic 
institutions appear more natural than those of political institutions, and provide a kind 
of ultimacy in the mutual legitimation of economic and political power, so the idea of 
competition also provides a bridge from human-made forms of contest, to principles 
of nature itself.  In a world where centralized sources of religious and moral authority 
have weakened, this naturalization provides an alternative kind of authority. 
 
The idea of competition not only has this naturalizing connotation, it is also 
constitutive of legitimation processes for the liberal economy and state.  It is not 
simply that competition occurs, but that outcomes are the result of competition, and 
this is what renders them, culturally, fair and valid.  Because we are accustomed to 
thinking about legitimacy in terms of the validation of an authority that has the power 
to make binding decisions (whether a person or an institution), it is easy to lose sight 
of the way that competition itself, as an accepted means of adjudicating outcomes, 
legitimates these in a way in which ‘authority’ in its fullest sense, recedes into the 
background, absorbing legitimation into the process of competition.  Of course forms 
of competition vary, in some the very outcome identifies the appropriate ‘winner’ 
(first over the finish-line, most correct answers, or votes), in others there are ‘judges’ 
who, perhaps through further contestation, reach an agreed outcome (and whose 
judgment may be challenged).  In the latter cases the role of the ‘authority’, 
particularly in the sense of an expert, comes back in.  The point is that the arbitrary 
judgment of the contextually powerful is supposedly minimized, and subordinated to 
a process which is itself legitimate. 
 
If competition were merely central to the core institutions of economy and politics, 
and marginal in other parts of social life, the present argument would be weakened.  
But the situation is the opposite, competition is a ramifying cultural trope.  It is 
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difficult to find any area where it is not routinely implemented.  Current debates in the 
UK about how to improve standards in school education involve the merits of testing, 
which inevitably involve competition for ranking among schools, and institutions of 
higher education must compete with each other in formal rankings of their research 
and teaching performances.  Competition sports is a central cultural pastime, 
providing daily drama in the form of contest, and even in the realm of television 
entertainment, increasingly ‘unknowns’ or quasi-celebrities (‘like you or me’) 
compete to become pop stars, ballroom dancers, models, or to last the longest 
sequestered in a house, or the jungle.  In these iconic cultural rituals, competitors have 
to perform, undergo tests of skill and endurance, be subject to the decisions of a panel 
of judges, and succeed in public votes, often in complex combinations.  The point is 
simply that liberal culture is saturated by competition, from the serious business of the 
allocation of economic resources, to a gamut of leisure pastimes, and in this way 
isomorphic processes of legitimation both large and small are diffused throughout the 
social system.  In this light it is worth remembering a point often made, that as long as 
it is contained within shared rules, conflict, in the form of competition, can actually 
create and strengthen social ties (Gluckman 1955; Haugaard 1997). 
 
Observing that liberal society exhibits extreme cultural elaboration of competition, is 
not to argue that competition is somehow alien to human nature, a modern by-product 
of the capitalist economy.  Diverse forms of competition can be found across a wide 
array of human societies, competition for territory and resources, for advantageous 
marriages, for bureaucratic positions, for the favor of supernatural beings, ad 
infinitum.  Even the idea that this liberal elaboration of competition was kick-started 
by capitalism in the first instance is problematic.  In the west European heartland of 
capitalism’s formation, it was increasingly imperial competition between growing 
dynastic states, in the exceptionally politically fragmented European peninsula (cf. 
Chirot 1994; Hall 1985; Tilly 1975), that drove the growth in banking, the search for 
new world resources, and eventually the growth of commerce and capitalism.  It 
might be illuminating to think in terms of the rise, not of capitalism, but of 
‘systematically competitive society’, in which there was a complex development of 
the institutionalization of competition across multiple domains: economy, politics, 
religion, arts and letters, popular culture, and so on. 
 
Conclusions 
 
For the great imperial culture of the Aztecs (c. 1350-1521), the key symbol of power 
that leaps to mind is the practice of ceremonial human sacrifice. Less widely known is 
that this pinnacle ritual of blood-letting took place within a cultural context in which 
small ritual acts of autosacrifice, personal blood letting in order propitiate gods and 
purify the soul, were part of the routine of everyday Aztec life.  A chain of cultural 
significance ran from piercing one’s earlobe with a maguey thorn to extract a few 
drops of blood, to help insure personal good fortune, and cutting the heart out of a 
living war captive with a flint knife, to ensure the cosmic and ecological balances on 
which the whole society was based.  In both instances, at the same time that cosmic 
and moral order was being affirmed, complex social hierarchies were being 
legitimated (Wolf 1999: 133-195).  Similarly, a chain of significance runs from our 
minor daily encounters with competition, whether at work or at leisure, and the great 
competitions for political office and economic might that frame liberal society.  It 
runs also from our personal experiences of distinctions between private and public 
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dimensions of our own lives that we want to preserve, and great public debates about 
the proper limits of the state’s claims on the individual, and vice-versa.  And as with 
the Aztecs, profoundly unequal distributions of social power are reinforced and 
legitimated through these chains of significance.  In both cases, core, ramifying 
patterns of belief and action, institutionally sustained, embed personal experiences of 
power and its legitimation within a corresponding cosmology of social power. 
 
To return to my ‘hook’ borrowed from Granovetter, the historical success of liberal 
societies despite relative political disengagement of large portions of the citizenries 
from those systems, is only seemingly paradoxical.  A complex web of weaker and 
more localized spheres of authority and legitimation, add up to a systemically strong 
and highly adaptable form of society, despite the indeterminate appearance of 
collective private investment in public authority.  To return to basic conceptual 
problems, we need to understand how power relations in the societies we live in 
actually are mediated, and it is not adequate to either deny or exaggerate systemic 
legitimacy, simply on the basis of an absence of either resounding affirmation of, or 
challenge to, state power from those subject to that power.  The process is much more 
subtle than that.  Moreover, if one wants to have an active critical public discourse in 
regard to power, then that implies engagement with ideas of authority and legitimacy 
as such, not just shadowy power processes going on behind our backs.  Central to my 
argument is that the processes that legitimate liberal society, far from being hidden, 
are in such plain view that we take them for granted.  My purpose in this preliminary 
cultural analysis, is to reorient our attention towards them, and the larger social 
patterns they are part of, so that we can better describe and analyze our own society, 
and where necessary, critique it.  
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